The Germans: "An Anti-Semitic People.ΓÇ¥ - The Press Campaign After 9 November 1938
Source: Herbert Obenhaus , International conference: German Society's Responses to Nazi Anti-Jewish Policy 1933-1941, Yad Vashem, 10-13 February 1995.
Convincing newspaper readers of the correctness of Nationalist Socialist policies towards Jews was not the sole aim of steering the press. Above and beyond this, its task was to deal with the problem of how the central German ideology of integration - nationalism, stood in relation to the central element of National Socialist ideology ΓÇô anti-Semitism. M. Rainer Lepsius claimed that the Third Reich ... was founded much more on belief in German nationalism than on agreement with the National Socialist ideology.' 75 If one continues this train of thought, this could well have given rise to the fear that an essential element of National Socialist ideology - anti-Semitism - would be pushed into the background during the weeks and months of the unification of Austria and the Sudetenland with the German Reich. The central role of anti-Semitism in Nazi ideology, especially its function of combining antagonistic parts ... for instance anti- bolshevism and verbal anti-capitalism,' made action necessary 76 . In this respect, the pogrom and its consequences were possibly a welcome occurrence, in order to consciously emphasise anti-Semitism in a period of national enthusiasm. From a propagandistic point of view, it was now simply a matter of amalgamating both ideologies, a task for which history lent itself. An investigation of the sources shows that this issue was acknowledged and realised by the Ministry of Propaganda, as well as by the party's press service.
At the Ministry of Propaganda's press c, the predominance of both ideologies in the creation of integration can be clearly demonstrated by referring to the character of the " Spiesser .ΓÇ¥ According to the Ministry of Propaganda's descriptions, he represented a group of people who combined National Socialism with a traditionally anti-Semitic attitude, but who more or less tolerated the Jews - at least not denying them their right to exist. The Ministry of Propaganda attacked the Spiesser as the most dangerous adversary to the radically anti-Semitic consensus, one who questioned the policy of excluding Jews from German society.
In contrast to the suggestions made by the Ministry of Propaganda, the party's press service was quite clear on the question of competing ideologies. Like the ministry, the NSK deliberated as to how it should handle those who eluded the anti-Jewish campaign after 9 November - namely, those whom Berndt had called the " Spiesser .ΓÇ¥ The NSK carefully adhered to the advice that under no circumstances would it convey the impression that the group of ΓÇ£those who said noΓÇ¥ was large. Accordingly, they used the term ΓÇ£a handful of political late-risers" who would not "hear or see or read anything." In keeping with Berndt, this group was described as bourgeois, liberal and individualistic. They asked themselves, What have the Jews got to do with me?' in order to avoid having to give an opinion on the issue, just as one had once said: What have the others got to do with you? You cast your ballot just like Gustav Stresemann . (Was gehen Dich die andern an, Du waehlst wie Gustav Stresemann .) The others,' the NSK continued, were us Nazis and ΓÇ£other people.' The party press service then began to refer more frequently to this group as "intellectuals - with an ΓÇ£educatedΓÇ¥ vocabulary." They were also called "bourgeois intellectuals" and "outsiders." Elsewhere they are noted as those people whose advancement was made possible - and whose "pensions" were secured - by the National Socialist State. Without question, a part of the social elite referred to here, profited from National Socialism, yet did not help - or only partially helped - to support the persecution of Jews. The NSK wanted both to defame opponents of the persecution of Jews as a minority outside of the national community and to arouse hostility against intellectuals and educated people, indeed against the old elite in its entirety. At the same time, it was claimed that National Socialist policies were supported by the wide majority of the people 77 .
Following this fairly clear characterisation of that part of the social elite that profited from National Socialism, yet kept its distance from the core area of National Socialist ideology - radical anti-Semitism 78 , the NSK discussed in great detail and depth the subject of competition between the central ideologies of integration of nationalism and National Socialism. The NSK claimed that it was indeed "not difficult" to be proud of national successes, when the squadrons of the Luftwaffe thunder over the Zeppelin Lawn in Nuremberg, or when our young Wehrmacht march through the streets, or when ten million Germans return home to the Reich cheering emphatically and thankfully.' 79 National sentiment grew naturally after the Treaty of Versailles was signed upon rearmament, and the annexation of Austria and the Sudetenland turned the German Reich into the Great German Reich. However, in addition, it was necessary that the people develop an understanding of "the political process" which reinforced the exclusion of Jews from German society. Opponents to the persecution of Jews - those nationalists who lacked a sense of the correctness of National Socialism, in particular radical anti-Semitism - were denied membership in the national community...Today, the ΓÇ£simpleΓÇ¥ national comrade, who sees the last mask torn from the Jew's face and who trusts that the leaders are doing everything for the benefit of the people...may rightfully refuse to tolerate being bothered by a few frightened souls standing on the fringe...' 80
The competition between the two ideologies of integration, which was criticised by the authorities responsible for steering the press, may be the point of departure for a critique of the view held by Daniel Jonah Goldhagen of the dominance of an eliminatory anti-Semitism. In his opinion, well before the Nazis came to power ... a virulent and violent ΓÇ£eliminationistΓÇ¥ variant of anti-Semitism" had developed, which called for the elimination of Jewish influence or of Jews themselves from German society.' 81 The discussion that ensued after 9 November shows that even at this time, which coincided with the greatest successes of domestic and foreign policy, National Socialist propaganda was still concerned with the population's acceptance of its anti-Semitic program, that was geared towards the exclusion of Jews from German society. In any case, it is doubtful whether one can speak of an "acceptance" of this ideology in the political consciousness of the people. In my opinion, doubts about whether this ideology was accepted are indeed valid, because while insisting that the anti-Jewish policy be accepted - one could also say, while courting the self-image of the Germans as an "anti-Semitic people" - only the liberal and national conservative elite were being addressed. Or, to put it in the words of the NSK : it was the last remaining, footsore rearguard of Stresemann's Foot Guard.' 82 These were the only ones criticised for their lack of understanding of "the political process" of complete separation from Jews. Other social groups, above all the working class, were not mentioned at all, although in this circle, too, only limited approval of an eliminatory anti-Semitism could be expected 83 . And finally, complete silence prevailed with regard to that part of the population that had no interest whatsoever in the fate of the German Jews 84 . The reason for the failure to mention working-class people and other groups with non-conforming opinions undoubtedly lies in the calculation that to criticise other social groups would lead to the collapse of the ΓÇ£vanishing minority.ΓÇ¥ As mentioned above, this minority was said to consist of the one percent of "those people who had said no" in the elections after the National Socialists took power and who did not support the persecution of Jews and their excfrom German society. Thus no doubt is cast on the strength of the support for the regime in 1938; however, there was obviously more support on a national level and less for the core area of National Socialist ideology - anti-Semitism.
After 9 November, however, the policy pursued regarding German Jews was certainly intended to be eliminationist. The press campaign in the winter of 1938-39 coincided with the redirecting of propaganda efforts towards the immediate preparation for war after the Munich conference, which would have suggested to the leaders of the NSDAP that anti-Semitic activities be intensified 85 . The campaign was intended to prepare the population - with a wealth of incisive measures ΓÇô for what was still in store for German Jews. By introducing historical and regional dimensions, the campaign revitalised the traditions of German anti-Semitism with a high degree of urgency. It openly pronounced relentlessness and harshness. The purpose of this turn in the campaign was to confront the Germans with their national history and to force them to acknowledge this history - to acknowledge it as their own historical and national identity, and at the same time acknowledge anti-Semitism in its barbaric variant, that is, eliminationist anti-Semitism. With this new clarity of concepts and language - but also with the clarity of the interpretation of history and its praise for the barbarity of the pogroms in Germany during the Middle Ages - it was consistent that, ultimately, Hitler would openly pronounce the future prospects for the Jews. In his speech before the German Reichstag on 30 January 1939, he declared that should a world war again occur, the result would be the extermination of the Jewish race in Europe.' 86
References:
75 M. Rainer Lepsius, ΓÇ£Das Erbe des Nationalsozialismus und die politische Kultur der Nachfolgestaaten des ΓÇ£Grossdeutschen Reiches,ΓÇ¥ in: Kultur und Gesellschaft , Max Haller, Hans-J. Hoffmann-Nowotny and Wolfgang Zapf, eds., commissioned by the German, Austrian and Swiss Society for Sociology, Frankfurt am Main, 1989, pp. 247-264, specifically pp. 253 f.
76 Hans Mommsen, ΓÇ£Die Funktion des Antisemitismus im Dritten Reich.' Das Beispiel des Novemberprogroms,ΓÇ¥ in: Antisemitismus. Von religioeser Judenfeindschaft zur Rassenideologie , Guenther Brakelmann and Martin Rosowski, eds., Goettingen 1989, pp. 179-192, specifically p. 184.
77 Ernst Guenter Dickmann, ΓÇ£Was gehen mich die Juden an? Der Volksgenosse und die Judenfrage - Gruendliche Aufklaerung bis zum letzten Mann,ΓÇ¥ NSK 280 (30 November 1938), pp. 2ff..
78 For more details on the consequences of this distance, see Mommsen, ΓÇ£Funktion des Antisemitismus,ΓÇ¥ p. 183.
79 Mommsen, ΓÇ£Funktion des Antisemitismus,ΓÇ¥ p. 3.
80 Ibid.
81 Daniel Jonah Goldhagen, Hitler's Willing Executioners. Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust , London, 1996, p. 23.
82 NSK 265, p. 2.
83 See Mommsen, ΓÇ£Funktion des Antisemitismus,ΓÇ¥ p. 183, who writes that among the working class, anti-Semitism plays virtually no role whatsoever.' See Rosemarie Leuschen-Seppel, ΓÇ£Arbeiterbewegung und Antisemitismus,ΓÇ¥ in: Antisemitismus. Von religioeser Judenfeindschaft zur Rassenideologie , Guenther Brakelmann and Martin Rosowski, eds., Goettingen 1989, pp. 77-96.
84 Compare the list of social groups that criticised the anti-Jewish politics of the regime: Ian Kershaw, ΓÇ£German Popular Opinion and the Jewish Question,' 1939-1943: Some further Questions,ΓÇ¥ in: Die Juden im Nationalsozialistischen Deutschland/The Jews in Nazi Germany 1933-1943 , Arnold Paucker, ed., Tuebingen, 1986, pp. 365-86, specifically pp. 369 f., 383. See also Bankier, oeffentliche Meinung, pp. 123-138.
85 Reference to this can be found in Mommsen, ΓÇ£Funktion des Antisemitismus,ΓÇ¥ p. 186.
86 Max Domarus, Hitler. Reden und Proklamationen 1932-1945 , Munich, 1965, vol. 2, p. 1058.
